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INTRODUCTION
Since 1908 when the Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908), tribal reserved water rights have been the subject of numerous adjudications and
Congressional settlements involving Indian reservations in many different states, 1 including
Idaho. 2 Through all this time, there has never been a determination by a court or Congress that a
federally recognized tribe had no reserved water rights at all for its Reservation. The argument
that the North Idaho Water Rights Group (“NIWRG”) is advancing here, seeking a ruling that the
Coeur d’Alene Tribe has no reserved water rights, is a fundamental attack on the very notion that
Indian tribes are entitled to federally protected water rights on their reservations.
NIWRG dresses up this extreme argument in various ways, relying in large part on a
strict “test of necessity,” NIWRG Br. at 11-20, that is fundamentally inconsistent with the
Winters doctrine itself. According to NIWRG, the “test of necessity” would defeat reserved
water rights claims for every single purpose advanced by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe (“Tribe”) and
the United States. While Winters and its progeny assure that water is broadly reserved for the
purposes of an Indian reservation, NIWRG suggests instead that the Tribe should be relegated to
a bleak survival without water either for traditional purposes or for future progress—not for
hunting and fishing, not for agriculture, and not even for domestic uses. NIWRG Br. at 12-16,
16-20, 23-24. In NIWRG’s view, reserved water isn’t “necessary” for those purposes unless the
Tribe’s members simply could not live on the Reservation at all without it. No court has ever
suggested such an approach to tribal reserved water rights.
1

Tribal water rights settlements ratified by Congress through 2010 are compiled in Cohen’s
Handbook of Federal Indian Law (“Cohen’s Handbook”), § 19.05[2] at 1247-48, n. 47 (Nell
Jessup Newton, ed., 2012).
2
Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-447, div. J, tit. X, 118 Stat. 2809,
3431-41 (Nez Perce Tribe); Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-602,
104 Stat. 3059 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribes).
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NIWRG’s apparent reason for advancing this absolute “necessity” argument is that the
Tribe’s reserved water rights claims could otherwise adversely impact junior state water right
holders. NIWRG Br. at 11.

Of course, that is the overall nature of water law in a prior

appropriation system—in water short periods, junior users may be impacted by senior right
holders, whether Indian or non-Indian. But while all water users face that basic scenario,
NIWRG somehow finds that result unacceptable with respect to senior tribal water rights, and
advances state law interests as a rationale to undermine the very existence of tribal reserved
water rights.
NIWRG’s arguments cannot be reconciled with the foundational legal principles
governing tribal reserved water rights. First, the Tribe’s rights are governed by federal law. This
is so as a matter of constitutional law, because “[w]ith the adoption of the Constitution, Indian
relations became the exclusive province of federal law.” Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985). As a feature of Tribal property rights, the Tribe’s water rights
are unquestionably federal rights, as to which federal law governs, preempting state law.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963) (“Arizona I”); City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 145
Idaho 497, 503, 180 P.3d 1048 (2008) (“Pocatello”).

Since federal law controls the

determination of tribal water rights and accords them seniority over state water rights that vest
after creation of the Reservation, state law cannot provide any basis for restricting the Tribe’s
senior rights. While NIWRG gives lip service to the primacy of federal law, NIWRG Br. at 6, it
in fact complains that “[i]f allowed, the federal claims threaten future curtailment of vested, state
law water rights,” NIWRG Br. at 11, and implies that tribal water rights are eclipsed by “the
purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress,” id. (citing California v.
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U.S., 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978)—a case that does not involve tribal reserved water rights).
NIWRG’s approach would stand the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution on its head.
Second, NIWRG’s test of absolute necessity runs afoul of the well-established principle
that agreements with Indian tribes must be construed as the Indians themselves would have
understood them. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999).
This principle has equal application to treaties and other agreements with Tribes. Winters, 207
U.S. at 576; Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 576. In disregard of this principle, NIWRG in effect argues
that the Tribe entered into agreements with the United States regarding the need for a
Reservation, and that in doing so the Tribe understood that those agreements provided no
reserved water at all to ensure that the Reservation would be a viable homeland for the Tribe.
Particularly since the record reflects the abiding importance of water to the Coeur d’Alene Tribe,
and since the very location of the Reservation turned on the Tribe’s insistence on the inclusion of
waterways vital to the life of the Tribe, it is simply inconceivable to suggest that the Tribe
nevertheless understood that it was agreeing to a Reservation without any right to reserved water
for any purpose. NIWRG offers no evidence that this was the Tribe’s understanding, and there is
none. The record demonstrates precisely the opposite—that water was the lynchpin of the
negotiations leading to the creation of the Reservation, and so the Indians would have understood
that in establishing the broad purposes of the Reservation, their right to water both for their
traditional practices and for their advances in the modern world, would be protected.
We turn next to NIWRG’s specific arguments.
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ARGUMENT
I.

New Mexico Does Not Apply to the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s Reserved Water
Rights, and NWIRG’s Reliance on New Mexico to Impose a Stringent “Test
of Necessity” to Defeat the Tribe’s Rights Must be Rejected.

As this Court has emphasized in discussing tribal reserved water rights: “American law
treats Indian tribes differently than it does sovereign nations or private individuals.” Pocatello,
145 Idaho at 506. Ignoring this fundamental principle, NIWRG assumes that aspects of the
ruling in U.S. v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), apply to defeat all Tribal water rights in this
case. See NIWRG Br. at 7. This flawed assumption is the basis for much of NIWRG’s
argument. In particular, NIWRG relies on New Mexico to limit the Tribe’s reserved water rights
under federal law not only to what NIWRG deems to be the “primary” purposes for which the
Reservation was established, but also to impose an overarching and impossible standard for
when reserved water is necessary Id.
NIWRG’s argument is fundamentally flawed because New Mexico, which determined the
water rights of a national forest, has no application to the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. As this
Court has recognized, the purposes of an Indian reservation must be construed according to wellestablished principles that apply to Indian tribes:
First and foremost is the notion that agreements with Indians are to be interpreted to the
benefit of the tribes. For example, the Supreme Court has stated,
[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as “that unlettered people” understood
it, and “as justice and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the
strong over those to whom they owe care and protection,” and counterpoise the
inequality “by the superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right,
without regard to technical rules.”
U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81, . . . (1905) (citing Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119
U.S. 1, 28, . . . (1886); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, . . . (1899)). Congress certainly has
the power to abrogate Indian treaty rights, but its intent to do so must be clear. See, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202, . . . (1999); U.S.
v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40, . . . (1986) (abrogation of treaty rights requires “clear
evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the
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one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty.”).
Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07. It is these principles—not New Mexico’s approach regarding
national forests—that control in this case.
Contrary to NIWRG’s contention, an Indian reservation is not limited to a single purpose
to the exclusion of all others, nor is it reasonable to conclude that an Indian reservation has no
“need” for reserved water rights if the purposes of the reservation can be fulfilled by another
source. 3 Unlike the national forest in New Mexico, an Indian reservation involves the ongoing
life of a people on lands promised to them. As would be the case for the life for any people over
time, this cannot be reduced to one formulaic purpose. Rather, as the Indians would have
understood it at the time the Reservation was established, Tribal life on the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation was centered upon traditional activities like hunting, fishing, and gathering, more
modern economic pursuits like farming and industrial development, and everyday activities like
drinking and washing—and water is needed for all of these purposes. 4 As Winters and its
progeny hold, water for an Indian reservation is reserved broadly, consistent with the purposes of
the reservation, which include providing a permanent home for the Indians to live—to raise their
families, to pursue their traditions, and to advance their economies. See, e.g., Winters, 207 U.S.
at 576; Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 598-601.

3

A similar argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Winters, where the Court found that
the Fort Belknap Tribes were entitled to a water right in the Milk River despite the non-Indian
water users’ argument that sufficient water from springs and streams within the reservation could
meet the Indians’ water needs. See 207 U.S. at 570, 576; see also In re Gen. Adjudication of All
Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 747-48 (Ariz. 1999) (“Gila III”)
(holding that a right to pump groundwater under state law did not obviate a federal reserved
right).
4
The Tribe has appealed the district court’s dismissal of Tribal claims for traditional activities
other than hunting and fishing, as well as for industrial, commercial, and mixed municipal uses,
but those are the subject of a separate appeal before this Court. See Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. State,
Case No. 45383-2017 (In re CSRBA, Case No. 49576, Subcase No. 91-7755).

5

This is true for the Coeur d’Alene Reservation where the 1873 Agreement provided that
the “Indians agree to locate and make their homes upon the reservation” and the 1887 Agreement
confirmed that the “Reservation shall be held forever as Indian lands and as homes for the Coeur
d’Alene Indians.” R. at 4202 (Second Aff. Vanessa Boyd Willard, Ex. 5 (Agreement with the
Coeur d’Alene of July 28, 1873) (“1873 Agreement”))); 1391 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 4
(Agreement with the Coeur d’Alene of Mar. 26, 1887 (“1887 Agreement”))). Broad homeland
purposes are clearly reflected in the negotiations leading to the creation of the Reservation in
1873—in which the Indians emphasized the importance of waters to the present and future lives
of their people. See Section II infra. Certainly, the Indians would have understood that in
agreeing to provide the United States with the lands it coveted and with the peace it desired, they
were retaining for their Reservation the waters necessary for a viable, long-term home, not one
limited to a single activity.
In key respects, the purposes of Indian reservations, like the Coeur d’Alene Reservation,
are the polar opposite from the purposes of national forests, like that at issue in New Mexico.
The strong preemptive force of federal law protecting Indian present and future uses of water
when Indian reservations are established is entirely absent in the case of national forests. As
New Mexico states, “Congress authorized the national forest system principally as a means of
enhancing the quantity of water that would be available to the settlers of the arid west.” 438 U.S.
at 713. In sharp contrast, Indian reservations were created to provide places for tribes to
maintain and develop their homelands, with water for both present and future uses. Put simply,
national forests were intended in considerable part to protect settlers in their uses of water under
state law while Indian reservations were largely intended to protect tribes from the settlers’ uses
of water. This dichotomy reflects a fundamentally different relationship with state law—with
national forests there is a basic deference to state law, while with Indian reservations, federal law
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is strongly preemptive. See, e.g., R. at 2231 (Special Master Report, Arizona I) (finding “[t]he
suggestion is unacceptable that the United States intended the Indians would be required to
obtain water for their future needs by acquiring appropriative rights under state law”); U.S. v.
McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1939) (rejecting state law as a basis for acquiring water
rights on the Flathead Indian Reservation reasoning that “the Montana statutes regarding water
rights are not applicable because Congress at no time has made such statutes controlling in the
reservation”); Cohen’s Handbook § 19.03[4], at 1218 (“States have considerable power over
federal lands, and Congress has generally deferred to state water law relative to federal lands.
By contrast, the establishment of an Indian reservation . . . preempt[s] state jurisdiction . . .
Congress has never deferred to state water law relative to Indian reservations.”) (footnotes
omitted).
These differences further underscore why the purposes for reserved rights for national
forests are narrowly construed as in New Mexico, while purposes for Indian reservations are
broadly construed. In Potlatch Corp. v. U.S., 134 Idaho 916, 12 P.3d 1260 (2000), this Court
discussed the differing goals for Indian reservations as contrasted with other federal reservations.
[Whereas] Winters dealt with the creation of a reservation by treaty, a bargained for
exchange between two entities[, a federal law creating other reservations, like] the
Wilderness Act [which established the National Wilderness Preservation System], is not
an exchange; it is an act of Congress that sets aside land, immunizing it from future
development. There is no principle of construction requiring the Court to interpret [it] to
create an implied water right.
Id. at 920. 5 Both the Montana Supreme Court and Arizona Supreme Court have also recognized
the significant differences between the creation of Indian reservations and other kinds of
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See also Goodman Oil Co. of Lewiston v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 136 Idaho 53, 57, 28 P.3d
996, 1000 (2001) (“Indian reservations are different; distinct from every other type of
reservation, i.e., national parks, wilderness areas, military reservations, and even further, Indian
reservations are a distinct entity within the law.”).
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reservations and held that New Mexico does not apply in determining the reserved water rights
on an Indian reservation. 6 See State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of
Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 766-68 (Mont. 1985) (“Greely”); In re Gen. Adjudication of
All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 76-77 (Ariz. 2001) (“Gila V”).
NIWRG also attempts to use New Mexico as the basis for an absolute “test of necessity”
that precludes a federal reserved water right if other non-federal sources of water are available
(even temporarily), because the lack of a federal reserved right would not entirely defeat the
purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. NIWRG Br. at 7, 11-12. But that is not the test for
finding a tribal reserved water right.
An implied reservation of water for an Indian reservation exists where water is necessary
to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; Gila V, 35 P.3d at 71
(quoting Cappaert v. U.S., 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976)); see also Greely, 712 P.2d at 762
(“reserved water rights are established by reference to the purposes of the reservation”). The
standard is not, as NIWRG suggests, whether only a federal reserved water right can fulfill the
purposes of the reservation, but whether the underlying purposes of the reservation envision
water use. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1269. If water is needed for the particular purpose—i.e.,
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The Ninth Circuit has indicated that New Mexico does not directly apply to Winters doctrine
rights on Indian reservations, but nevertheless found it provides useful guidelines. Agua
Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1269 n.6 (9th
Cir. 2017) (“Agua Caliente”) (“we have previously noted that New Mexico is ‘not directly
applicable to Winters doctrine rights on Indian reservations’”) (citations omitted). While the
Ninth Circuit’s approach fails to give adequate consideration to the federal Indian law principles
that distinguish the situation regarding national forests from that involving Indian reservations,
the holding in Agua Caliente does not support limiting tribal reserved water rights to a single,
narrow purpose. Rather, the Ninth Circuit held in Agua Caliente that “[t]he general purpose, to
provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one that must be liberally construed.” Id. at 1270
(quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Walton I”)
(emphasis in original)); see also id. at 1265 (“The Executive Orders establishing the reservation
are short in length, but broad in purpose.”).
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for sustaining life on an Indian reservation—reserved water is “necessarily” implied. See, e.g.,
Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 598-99 (finding a reserved right to water where water was “essential to the
life of the Indian people”). Therefore, the question before this Court is whether the parties in
1873 intended to establish the Reservation for purposes that need water.
NIWRG relies on the decisions of this Court in State v. U.S., 134 Idaho 940, 12 P.3d
1284 (2000), and U.S. v. State, 135 Idaho 655, 23 P.3d 117 (2001), to support its position. 7
Neither case deals with an Indian reservation or the special principles applicable to tribal
reserved water rights, nor do they support NIWRG’s cramped view of when a federal reserved
right is necessary even for other kinds of reservations.
In State v. U.S., this Court denied reserved water rights for the Sawtooth National
Recreation Area (“Sawtooth NRA”) because the purpose of creating the Sawtooth NRA was “to
protect [it] from the dangers of unregulated development and mining operations.” 134 Idaho at
944 (emphasis added). This Court found that no water was necessary to fulfill this regulatory
purpose. Id. at 946 (water not needed to “control the rate and manner of development of the
area” or for “limiting mining operations”); see also id. at 947 (“This protection is afforded by the
existence of statutes and regulations governing mining operations in the Sawtooth [NRA].”); id.
at 946 (“[t]hese purposes are, and have been, accomplished through the promulgation of land use

7

In addition to these two cases from this Court, NIWRG also relies on Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (“Puyallup III”), as a case it contends
“concluded that the power of the state was adequate for protection of the fish, and a federal
reserved water right was not necessary to fulfill that purpose.” NIWRG Br. at 14. NIWRG’s
contention that Puyallup III found that “a federal reserved water right was not necessary” is
wrong. In Puyallup III, there was no issue of reserved water rights before the Supreme Court,
and no determination of water rights was made there. Puyallup III only considered the extent to
which the State of Washington could regulate the Puyallup Tribe’s fishing rights. See 433 U.S.
at 167.
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regulations for the recreation area which control the rate and manner of development of the
area”).
Similarly, in U.S. v. State, this Court also found that no reserved water rights were
implied for islands reserved in the Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge (“Refuge”) because the
purpose of reserving the islands in the Refuge “was to create sanctuaries for migratory birds to
protect them from hunters and trappers so they would not become extinct and so they could
continue to benefit husbandry,” and a bird sanctuary does not need water because, even without
water surrounding the islands, “[h]unting is still prohibited and migratory birds still have a
sanctuary without a federal reserved water right.” 135 Idaho at 663-64. Again, this Court found
that fulfilling the purposes of the Refuge did not require water at all. The Coeur d’Alene
Reservation, of course, has far broader purposes than either the Refuge or the Sawtooth NRA, as
we show in Section II infra.
NIWRG’s “test of necessity” ignores the fundamental legal principle that state law is
simply not the source from which the Tribe derives its water rights—and the existence of state
laws, enacted after the Reservation was created, that provide for the use or protection of water
cannot be the basis on which to deny the Tribe federally reserved water rights. See, e.g., Agua
Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1269 (rejecting the argument that a tribe “does not need a federal reserved
[water] right” because “the Tribe has a correlative right to groundwater under California law”);
Gila III, 989 P.2d at 748 (finding state right to pump groundwater would not “adequately serve
to protect federal rights”); see also Walton I, 647 F.2d at 48 (finding that “the Tribe has a vested
property right in reserved water” and “subsequent acts making the historically intended use of
the water unnecessary do not divest the Tribe of the right to the water”).
In sum, NIWRG’s assumption that New Mexico applies and mandates a strict “test of
necessity” must be rejected. The legal principles applicable to Indian tribes are unique, the
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record here demonstrates that the purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation are broad, and
accordingly the New Mexico case, which involves a very different set of principles and statutes
and a very different type of reservation, provides no basis for defeating the Tribe’s claims to
waters that under the Winters doctrine were reserved to ensure a viable future for this Tribe on its
Reservation which was promised to it forever.
II.

Congress Ratified the Broad Purposes of Tribe’s 1873 Reservation Within
the Boundaries Confirmed by the 1891 Act.

The district court properly concluded that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established
by Executive Order in 1873 and that water rights were reserved to fulfill not only the
Reservation’s domestic and agricultural purposes, but also traditional fishing and hunting
purposes. R. at 4320-33 (Order on Mots. S.J.). 8 Contrary to this ruling, NIWRG asserts that the
only purpose for which the Tribe’s Reservation was established under the 1873 Agreement and
Executive Order was to “promot[e] an agrarian lifestyle on a diminishing reservation.” 9 NIWRG
Br. at 7-9. NIWRG’s position is not supported by the historical record and is contrary to Idaho
v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (“Idaho II”).

Rather, as we show next, the Tribe’s 1873

Reservation was established for broad purposes, including hunting and fishing.

And any

abrogation of the Tribe’s right to water for the purposes of the 1873 Reservation would require a
clear statement from Congress. U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986); Pocatello, 145 Idaho at
506. But here, there is nothing that remotely resembles a clear abrogation of the Tribe’s rights.

8
9

See supra n.4.
NIWRG makes passing references to the “diminished Reservation” in connection with the 1891
Act. See, e.g., NIWRG Br. at 4, 8. But “diminished” is a term of art in this context, which
connotes a change in Reservation boundaries as a result of a statute that opened the Reservation
to non-Indian settlement—which occurs only where Congress clearly and plainly intends such a
result. See Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078-79 (2016). The Coeur d’Alene
Reservation has never been held to be diminished, NIWRG did not raise any diminishment issue
below, and the issue is not presented here.
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In fact, the Supreme Court in Idaho II squarely held that in 1891 “Congress recognized the full
extent of the Executive Order reservation lying within the stated boundaries it ultimately
confirmed . . . .” 533 U.S. at 281. 10
A.

The Tribe’s 1873 Reservation was Established for Broad Purposes Including
Hunting and Fishing.
1.

The Tribe’s 1873 Reservation was established by Executive Order and must
be treated the same as any other Indian reservation for determining its
purposes.

As correctly recounted by the district court, in Idaho II the Supreme Court found that
Lake Coeur d’Alene and its related waterways were historically important to the Tribe for “food,
fiber, transportation, recreation, and cultural activities.” 533 U.S. at 265; R. at 4313 (Order on
Mots. S.J.). These broad purposes, each tied to the use of water, formed the backdrop to the
creation of the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation.

When the Tribe and United States reached an

agreement in 1873, the deal provided for the Tribe to relinquish claims to its aboriginal lands in
exchange for an expanded reservation that accommodated the Tribe’s insistence on inclusion of
key water bodies within the retained Reservation. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 266. Under the 1873
Agreement the Tribe agreed to “locate and make their homes upon the reservation.” R. at 4202
(1873 Agreement). The 1873 Agreement also “preserv[ed] the water resource[s]” to sustain the
Tribe’s traditional activities, including hunting and fishing, because it “added the rivers, lake and
waters . . . which they demanded remain under their control.” R. at 1589-90 (E. Richard Hart, A
History of Coeur d’Alene Tribal Water Use (Nov. 25, 2015) (“Hart Rep. 2015”))); see also Idaho
10

Idaho II principally focused on the Tribe’s traditional water uses and activities at the time the
Reservation was created in 1873 through congressional ratification in 1891, because the issue in
the case was title to submerged lands at the time of Idaho statehood. Idaho II did not look more
comprehensively at the additional purposes for which the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was
created but nonetheless strongly supports the intent of the United States and the Tribe in
reserving water for other present and future purposes, including agriculture, commerce, and
industry.
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II, 533 U.S. at 274 (“[a] right to control the lakebed and adjacent waters was traditionally
important to the Tribe”). In fact, the 1873 Agreement contains a provision unique to Coeur
d’Alene that expressly protects the Tribe’s water resources by stating that “the waters running
into said reservation shall not be turned from their natural channel where they enter said
Reservation.” R. at 4202 (1873 Agreement). At the same time, the Tribe was beginning to
advance in the arts of civilization, including agriculture and industry, and the 1873 Agreement
reflects an equally important focus on ensuring that the Tribe’s Reservation would sustain these
more modern pursuits. See U.S. v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1105 (D. Idaho 1998) (“Idaho
II”) (1873 Reservation would include Indian farms and allow for a mill at the upper falls); R. at
4202 (1873 Agreement) (providing for school, training in commercial and industrial pursuits); R.
at 1588 (Hart Rep. 2015) (Indians demanded extension of 1867 reservation to include Catholic
mission and mill privileges).
Although Congress did not ratify the 1873 Agreement, the President soon acted to
formalize the 1873 Reservation as set forth in the agreement. As the Supreme Court explained in
Idaho II:
[On November 8,] 1873 President Grant issued an Executive Order directing that the
reservation specified in the agreement be ‘withdrawn from sale and set apart as a
reservation for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.’
533 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted); R. at 1354 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 3 (Exec. Order of
Nov. 8, 1873)); see also 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (finding that the 1873 Executive Order was
intended to “create a reservation for the Coeur d’Alenes that mirrored the terms of the 1873
agreement”).
In support of its argument that the Reservation was established solely for agriculture,
NIWRG cites to statements by federal officials that reference placing the Tribe “on a reservation
suitable to their wants as an agricultural people” and to the 1873 Agreement’s inclusion of

13

agricultural and industrial tools for the Tribe. NIWRG Br. at 8. These statements must be read
in context of the Agreement as whole, which as discussed above, sought to protect both the
Tribe’s traditional way of life and more modern advancements. Moreover, Judge Lodge in Idaho
II explained that “[r]eports describing the Tribe’s agricultural successes” did not evidence that
the Tribe was no longer dependent on the Lake and rivers, and they “are in conflict with other
official assessments, are not necessarily based on personal knowledge, and may be tainted by
cultural and personal bias.” 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
NIWRG also asserts that the Tribe did not intend to preserve its traditional activities,
such as hunting and fishing, because its 1872 petition for an expanded Reservation stated that
“[w]e think it hard to leave at once old habits to embrace new ones; for a while yet we need to
have some hunting and fishing.” Id. The Tribe’s use of the phrase “for a while yet” however,
cannot reasonably be read to permanently divest the Tribe of rights it specifically sought to
protect in requesting a Reservation. When reading the 1872 petition as a whole, Judge Lodge in
Idaho II explained:
The second petition makes three points relevant to the Court’s present inquiry. First, the
Tribe never entertained the possibility of withdrawing to a reservation that did not
include the river valleys. Second, the Tribe considered the area adjacent to the
waterways its home. Third, and most important, in 1872 the Tribe continued to rely on
the water resource for a significant portion of its needs.
95 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. Idaho II and the historical record simply do not support a finding that
the Tribe’s Reservation is limited to an agricultural purpose.
NIWRG’s attempt to use Winters to support its position is also misplaced. NIWRG Br. at
8. Winters was a limited suit brought by the United States “to restrain [various non-Indians] . . .
from constructing or maintaining dams or reservoirs on the Milk River . . . or in any manner
preventing the water of the river or its tributaries from flowing to the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation.” 207 U.S. at 565. Unlike the present case, Winters was not a general stream
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adjudication to declare and quantify the Fort Belknap Tribes’ water rights for all purposes of that
Reservation. The United States simply sought to enjoin certain diversions of water upstream of
the Reservation that interfered with specific irrigation works that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
and the Tribes intended to construct and operate on the Reservation. There was consequently no
reason for the United States to introduce evidence of broader purposes, such as hunting and
fishing or other traditional activities, for which the Fort Belknap Reservation may have been
created. Here, by contrast, this case seeks to adjudicate and quantify all reserved water rights for
the Coeur d’Alene Reservation for all purposes of the Reservation, not just protect a particular
contemplated irrigation use from interference by junior users.
In sum, the issuance of the Executive Order reserved the 1873 Reservation for broad
purposes, which includes hunting and fishing. Idaho II, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. And the Tribe’s
reserved water rights vested no later than the date the Reservation was established. Arizona I,
373 U.S. at 600; see also U.S. v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984) (“tribal reserved
Winters rights vest on the date of the creation of the Indian Reservation”); cf. Winans, 198 U.S.at
381 (implied tribal rights predating the creation of the reservation carry a time immemorial
priority date). 11
2.

The 1887 Agreement confirmed the purposes of the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation.

Increasing encroachments from non-Indians caused the Tribe to be concerned that its
1873 Reservation could be jeopardized or altered. To guard against this, the Tribe sought
additional negotiations with the federal government in 1885 seeking congressional ratification of
its 1873 Reservation. The Tribe’s petition described its aboriginal territory and noted that “all

11

The district court correctly held that traditional fishing and hunting purposes carry a time
immemorial priority date and agricultural purposes carry an 1873 Reservation establishment
date. R. at 4326 (Order on Mots. S.J.).
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the lands of your petitioners, so by them owned and herein described, have been taken
possession of by the whites without remuneration or indemnity, except that portion now by them
occupied as the present Coeur d’Alene Reservation.” R. at 2041 (Aff. of Steven W. Strack, Ex. 4
(S. Exec. Doc. No. 122 (1886)) (reprinting Petition from Coeur d’Alene Tribe to President of
United States (Mar. 23, 1885)). 12 In response, Congress authorized a new commission to engage
in negotiations with the Tribe in 1886, and this enactment expressly recognized establishment of
the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation. R. at 1366 (Aff. of Richard Hart, Ex. 4, Report of Comm’r of
Indian Affairs, to Sec’y of Interior, at 18 (Dec. 13, 1887)) (an act “to enable said Secretary to
negotiate with the Coeur d’Alene Indians for the cession of their lands outside the limits of the
present Coeur d’Alene reservation to the United States”) (emphasis added); see also Idaho II,
533 U.S. at 262 (“Congress authorized new negotiations to obtain the Tribe’s agreement to cede
land outside the borders of the 1873 reservation.”) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court in
Idaho II explained:
Congress was free to define the reservation boundaries however it saw fit . . . [but]
Congress in any event made it expressly plain that its object was to obtain tribal interests
only by tribal consent. When in 1886 Congress took steps toward extinguishing

12

The petition also described the vast resources included in the Tribe’s territory and discussed
various items that the Tribe needed, like “grist and saw mills, proper farming implements, and
mechanics to help to teach us . . . industrial pursuits.” Id. at 2042. These items were not in
derogation of the Tribe’s traditional pursuits—rather they were listed in the context of
compensation to settle the Tribe’s claims to lands outside its current reservation—as the petition
explained it specifically sought to enter
“proper business negotiations under and by which your petitioners may be properly and
fully compensated for such portion of their lands not now reserved to them; that their
present reserve may be confirmed . . . and that ample provision be made by the United
States by which their compensation shall be annually made them partly in stock, tools,
mills, and mechanical instruction by proper mechanics, for the permanent benefit of
every member, young and old, male and female, of the Coeur d’Alene tribe of Indians.”
Id.
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aboriginal title to all lands outside the 1873 boundaries, it did so by authorizing
negotiation of agreements ceding title for compensation.
533 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). In other words, the clear understanding of Congress in 1886
was that the Tribe then held a Reservation that was established in 1873 and that any “Tribal
interests” that were obtained would require the consent of the Tribe.
Under the 1887 Agreement arising out of those negotiations, the Tribe once again agreed
to cede lands outside the “Coeur d’Alene Reservation” 13 and the Agreement confirmed that the
Reservation “shall be held forever as Indian lands and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.”
R. at 1391 (1887 Agreement, art. 5). The 1887 Agreement unequivocally confirms the Tribe’s
1873 Reservation and shows that the cession of lands was the only “Tribal interest” that the
Tribe consented to relinquish.
NIWRG cites to a handful of facts from the record that show the Tribe was engaging in
agriculture prior to and during negotiation of the 1887 Agreement. NIWRG Br. at 9. The facts
cited must be understood in context. In the 1887 Agreement, the United States sought a cession
of land—there was no effort to strip from the Tribe the ability to use water for the broad
purposes the Reservation was established in 1873. See also, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. The facts
relied upon by NIWRG merely support the continued recognition of the Tribe’s efforts to engage

13

In fact, much of the 1887 negotiating history is limited to obtaining a cession of lands outside
the Tribe’s Reservation and the terms of compensation for that cession. In this respect the 1887
Agreement is substantially similar to the 1873 Agreement, which the federal negotiators used as
a reference. R. at 1383 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 4 (Report of Nw. Indian Comm’n, to
Comm’r of Indian Affairs at 53 (1887))). For example, like the 1873 Agreement, the 1887
Agreement provided that the federal government would expend federal funds to “erect[] on said
reservation a saw and grist mill, to be operated by steam, and an engineer and miller . . . [and to]
best promote the progress, comfort, improvement, education, and civilization of said Coeur
d’Alene Indians . . . .” R. at 1391 (1887 Agreement, art. 6). These provisions show that it was
important to the Tribe that the federal government fulfill the promises made in the 1873
Agreement and provide the resources necessary for the Tribe to realize the commercial and
industrial advancements it previously sought for its Reservation economy; thereby reflecting
continuity, not change, between the two Agreements.
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in the agricultural and more modern pursuits that it sought to advance within its 1873
Reservation, while at the same time maintaining its traditional activities. In fact, the Tribe
continued to engage in traditional activities throughout this time period, 14 and the historical
record makes clear that during negotiations, Chief Seltice insisted on the continued protection of
its 1873 Reservation and implored the commission to “preserve for us and our children forever
this reservation . . . [because] neither money nor land outside do we value compared with this
reservation. Make the paper strong; make it so strong that we and all the Indians living on it
shall have it forever.” R. at 2157 (Aff. of Steven Strack, Ex. 10 (Council with Coeur d’Alenes at
78 (Mar. 25, 1887)). As discussed above, the 1887 Agreement arising out of these negotiations
must be construed as it would have been understood by the Indians. Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506.
The Tribe simply could not have understood an agreement that was fortifying its 1873
Reservation and ceding lands outside the Reservation as somehow limiting all tribal life on the
Reservation to pursuing agricultural endeavors to the exclusion of all else.
Idaho II reinforces that the purposes of the Reservation remained unchanged by the 1887
Agreement. Given the Tribe’s traditional reliance on its waters, the Supreme Court in Idaho II
found that “Idaho [correctly] also conceded . . . that after Secretary of the Interior’s 1888 report
14

During the years prior to the 1887 agreement, the Tribe continued to engage in traditional
activities. For example, due to increasing conflicts in the late 1870s between non-Indians and
other Indian tribes, like the Nez Perce, the Coeur d’Alenes engaged in traditional gathering,
sometimes under the protection of tribal soldiers. R. at 1615 (Hart Rep. 2015 (“[a]t the time of
the outbreak of the Nez Perce War, the Coeur d’Alenes were digging camas near St. Maries”)).
Around 1878, in order to protect their land and water resources within their Reservation
boundaries, the Tribe decided to move many, but not all, of their villages and homes closer to the
De Smet area near their traditional camas grounds. Id. at 1615, 1621-23. See also R. at 653 (Ian
Smith, Historical Examination of the Purposes for the Creation of the Coeur d’Alene Indian
Reservation (2015)) (“Most Coeur d’Alene villages [on lakes and rivers] remained in use until at
least the 1870s, with some retaining ‘a permanent population as late as 1900.’”); R. at 2669-71
(Jt. Stmt. Facts) (summarizing continuance of traditional activities after 1873). Into the 1880s,
“the Tribe . . . continued to use their traditional fishing spots and remain true to tribal culture.” R.
at 1626 (Hart Rep. 2015).
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that the [1873] reservation embraced nearly ‘all the navigable waters of Lake Coeur d’Alene’ . . .
Congress was on notice that the Executive Order reservation included submerged lands.” Id. at
275. The Supreme Court would not have ruled that the Tribe owned the submerged lands in
Idaho II if by the time of Idaho statehood in 1890, the Tribe no longer needed these submerged
lands for hunting, fishing, and other traditional activities. E.g., 533 U.S. at 274 (finding that “[a]
right to control the lakebed and adjacent waters was traditionally important to the Tribe, which
emphasized in its petition to the Government that it continued to depend on fishing”).
3.

The 1889 Agreement and 1891 Act confirmed the purposes of the 1873
Reservation within the boundaries ratified by Congress.

This same pattern was repeated two years later. The 1889 Agreement—like the 1887
Agreement—only involved a cession of land. Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically concluded
in Idaho II that Congress “did not simply alter the 1873 boundaries unilaterally. Instead, the
Tribe was understood [by Congress] to be entitled beneficially to the reservation as then defined”
and Congress only sought an additional land cession within the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation that the
Tribe “shall consent to sell.” Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 277. Accordingly, Congress’s instructions
confirm that negotiations were limited and sought only a voluntary cession of land within the
Tribe’s 1873 Reservation and not any effort to undermine the broad purposes of the Reservation.
See id. at 280-81 (“[t]here is no indication that Congress ever modified its objective of negotiated
consensual transfer” and “[a]ny imputation to Congress either of bad faith or of secrecy in
dropping its express objective . . . is at odds with the evidence.”).
Here again, NIWRG incorrectly suggests that statements made during the 1889
negotiations show that the Tribe was primarily focused on agriculture and reflect the Tribe’s
intention to limit its traditional activities. NIWRG Br. at 10. While the statements cited by
NIWRG reflect an awareness that the Tribe was advancing in agriculture (which the district court
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properly found was another purpose of establishing the 1873 Reservation), none of the
statements indicate that the Tribe or the federal government understood the 1889 Agreement as
abrogating or relinquishing any of the purposes for which the 1873 Reservation was created. See
Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.
Contrary to NIWRG’s suggestion that traditional activities, like hunting and fishing, were
no longer important to the Tribe, NIWRG Br. at 10, the record shows that retaining their 1873
Reservation, including the Lake and associated waterways, remained a central concern for the
Tribe throughout the 1889 negotiations. See Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506. (“‘[I]t is the intention
of the parties, and not solely that of the superior side, that must control any attempt to interpret
the treaties.’”) (alteration in original).

For example, Coeur d’Alene leaders insisted upon

ratification of the 1887 Agreement, which confirmed their 1873 Reservation. See, e.g., R. at
1357 (Aff. of Richard Hart, Ex. 4 (Report of Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Sec’y of Interior, at 3
(Dec. 7, 1889))) (“[T]he Indians . . . absolutely refused to entertain any proposition [to relinquish
some of their Reservation] until the old agreement was ratified.”). The Tribe also expressed
fears of losing their homes and the importance of their lands and waters. See, e.g., Idaho II, 533
U.S at 270; R. at 2115 (Third Council with Coeur d’Alene Indians (Aug. 31, 1889)) (Chief
Seltice stating that “I, as an Indian, like my land; am very anxious to have land; I do not care
about money”). In response to the Tribe’s concerns, when explaining the new boundary line
under the 1889 Agreement, “General Simpson, a negotiator for the United States, reassured the
Tribe that ‘you still have the St. Joseph River and the lower part of the lake[,]’” 533 U.S. at 270,
“and all the meadow and agricultural land along the St. Joseph River.” U.S. v. Idaho, 210 F.3d
1067, 1071 n.6. (9th Cir. 2000) (“Idaho II”).
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And during this time the Tribe was continuing to engage in traditional activities,
notwithstanding its continued agricultural, commercial, and other industrial pursuits. 15 As Judge
Lodge found in Idaho II, “the placement of the boundary line [under the 1889 Agreement] was
for the purpose of establishing the Tribe’s rights to the Lake and rivers.” 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
Certainly, there was no clear expression, or agreement of the Indians, to any loss of any Tribal
rights, including water rights, within the portion of the 1873 Reservation the Tribe did not cede.
See Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.
Idaho II underscores this same understanding—that apart from ceding certain lands, the
Tribe retained all other rights on the Reservation that remained. The Supreme Court found that
the 1891 Act ratifying the Tribe’s Reservation “contained no cession by the Tribe of submerged
lands within the reservation’s outer boundaries.” 533 U.S. at 278. 16 So despite agreeing to an
additional cession in the 1889 Agreement, the Tribe did not relinquish any of its rights within the
boundaries of its remaining 1873 Reservation. 17 See also Idaho II, 210 F.3d at 1076 (given the
Tribe’s dependence on traditional activities “[i]n 1889, the borders of the reservation were
15

See, e.g., R. at 788 (Ian Smith, A Response to the Expert Report of Stephen Wee Regarding the
Establishment of and Purposes for the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation (May 26, 2016)
(“Smith Rep. 2016”)) (federal officials reported that during the 1880s and 1890s the Tribe
“continued to rely on hunting, fishing, and gathering activities on their traditionally occupied
lands” and in 1888 Commissioner J.D.C. Atkins reported that Coeur d’Alene tribal members
“occasionally go [to the Wolf Lodge district within the 1873 Reservation] hunting for elk and
deer”).
16
See also 210 F.3d at 1077 (in the 1889 act authorizing additional negotiations, the “express
reference to the reservation as the Tribe’s reservation, explicit recognition that the choice to sell
was the Tribe’s . . . all manifest an awareness and acceptance by Congress of the boundaries of
the 1873 reservation”).
17
After ratification and despite the pressures faced by the Tribe and its adaptation to civilized
and industrial pursuits, the Tribe continued to rely on traditional pursuits as part of their regular
lives. In July of 1891, for example, when the resident farmer at Coeur d’Alene attempted to get
a census of the Indians on the Reservation he “complained about the difficulty of obtaining an
‘accurate’ census of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe because many tribal members had ‘gone to the
mountains hunting and fishing which made it impossible to see them all.’” R. at 788 (Smith Rep.
2016).
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contracted and redrawn—but redrawn so as to ensure that the Tribe still had beneficial ownership
of the southern third of the Lake as well as the portion of the St. Joe River within the 1873
reservation”). 18
In sum, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements, and the 1891 Act, evidence a continued
recognition by both the Executive and Congress of the Tribe’s dependence on its water resources
for traditional purposes, and this served as the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho II.
III.

The Tribe’s Reserved Water Rights are Based on the Broad Purposes of the
Coeur d’Alene Reservation and Cannot be Divested by State Law.

As discussed in Section I supra, the purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation include
agricultural, hunting, fishing and domestic purposes—and since each of these purposes requires
water, the Winters doctrine provides that, as a matter of federal law, water was reserved for each
of these purposes when the Reservation was established in 1873. NIWRG, however, argues that
for each of these Reservation purposes, reserved water rights are not “necessary,” because state
law, in effect, provides an alternative that NIWRG deems appropriate. As discussed next, state
law is not a replacement for, and cannot supplant, federal law, and each of the purposes of the
Reservation is protected by a federal water right, in amounts to be determined during the
quantification phase of this case. Each of NIWRG’s arguments regarding water not being
“necessary” for the purposes of the Reservation must be rejected.

18

The Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he State has not challenged the district court’s factual
findings, nor has it challenged the court’s conclusion that executive actions reflect a clear intent
to include submerged lands within the 1873 reservation.” Idaho II, 210 F.3d at 1070. As such,
the Ninth Circuit “accept[ed] the facts as given” but also found that the facts “are amply
supported by the record.” Id. at 1073.
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A.

Reserved Water to Fulfill the Reservation’s Fishing and Hunting Purposes
Cannot be Defeated by Operation of State Law.

The Tribe claims federal reserved water rights to support the fishing and hunting
purposes of the Reservation, and the district court agreed. R. at 4322 (Order on Mots. S.J.)
NIWRG does not dispute that water is needed to support these purposes, but argues that the
Tribe does not have federally reserved water rights for fishing and hunting purposes because “the
State of Idaho has provided vested water right protections for important waterways within the
Reservation boundaries, making a federal water right unnecessary.” NWIRG Br. at 15. This
argument fails for several reasons.
First, NIWRG’s suggestion is tantamount to holding that the Idaho Legislature can divest
the Tribe of its federally protected water rights simply by passing a statute recognizing state
protections in the same stream. However, the State has no authority over the Tribe or Tribal
rights, including its reserved water rights—either to protect such rights or to regulate or diminish
them. See supra Section I; infra Section III.C.2. Instead, “[t]he Constitution vests the Federal
Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes.” Montana v. Blackfeet
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The Tribe’s
reserved water rights are created by federal law and are “dependent on, and subordinate to, only
the Federal Government, not the State.” Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980). Except as authorized by Congress, states have “no
power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation,” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220
(1959); Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976). Accordingly, protection of the
Tribe’s water rights in Coeur d’Alene Lake and other waterways on the Reservation depends on
federally protected reserved water rights, not any action by the State.
Second, NIWRG’s argument ignores the fundamental differences between these state law
water rights and the water rights the Tribe is entitled to under federal law. See infra Section
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III.C.2.

The Tribe’s reserved water rights under federal law are intended to protect the

Reservation as a homeland for the Tribe, including providing water for the special federallyprotected hunting and fishing rights enjoyed by the Tribe on its Reservation. The state water
rights relied upon by NIWRG are not intended to protect the Tribe, its Reservation, or its special
hunting and fishing rights. There is no basis that a state scheme that has no intention to protect
Tribal rights will somehow achieve that result. Furthermore, the State’s right under state law to
preserve the St. Joe River has a priority date of 1992, see Water Right No. 91-7122, while the
waters of Coeur d’Alene Lake has a priority date of 1927, see Water Right No. 95-2067. Both of
these water rights are junior to the Tribe’s reserved water rights for fishing and hunting purposes,
which have an immemorial priority date. Moreover, the State’s rights do not provide any
guarantees to the Tribe because they are subject to changes in state law and uncertain state
enforcement that the Tribe has no control over.
NIWRG is also wrong that the fact that Post Falls Dam “keeps the water [of the Lake] at
or above natural levels” eliminates the necessity for the Tribe’s reserved water rights. NIWRG
Br. at 16. 19 Post Falls Dam operates pursuant to a 50-year term license under the Federal Power
Act, which was effective June 1, 2009. Avista Corp., 127 FERC ¶61,265, ¶62,187 (2009). The
Tribe’s reserved water rights exist forever and protect the Tribe’s rights in perpetuity.
Accordingly, the Tribe must secure those rights from any future diminution resulting from third
parties, such as upstream diversions depleting the Lake.
This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s determination that the Tribe holds
reserved water rights to fulfill the hunting and fishing purposes of the Reservation.

19

NIWRG mistakenly claims that this is an “upstream dam [that] prevents water level
fluctuations in the lake . . . .” NIWRG Br. at 16. In fact, Post Falls Dam is downstream from the
Lake. See Avista Corp., 127 FERC ¶61,265, ¶62,160 (2009).
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B.

Reserved Water to Fulfill the Agricultural Purposes of the Reservation
Cannot be Defeated Based on Past Agricultural Practices.

NIWRG concedes that the district court “appropriately concluded that ‘one primary
purpose of the reservation was to establish an agrarian lifestyle’” for the Tribe and its members.
NIWRG Br. at 16 (quoting R. at 4320 (Order on Mots. S.J.)). 20 NIWRG then curiously faults the
district court for allowing the extent of the Tribe’s reserved rights for agricultural purposes to
proceed to the quantification stage of this case. NIWRG Br. at 17.
Instead, NIWRG contends that the court below should have dismissed the Tribe’s
agricultural claims without an evidentiary showing regarding the amount of water needed for
agriculture—which will occur during the quantification stage. NIWRG seeks to justify this
outcome because there is “no historical documentary evidence that indicates irrigation was
practiced” by the Tribe in the past. NWRG Br. at 18. NIWRG also alludes to two government
reports in 1921 and 1934 concluding there was no irrigation on the Reservation at those times.
NIWRG Br. at 19-20. But the historical record does reflect that the Tribe irrigated small farms
and gardens around the time the Reservation was created. R. at 4261 (Hart Rep. 2106)
Even so, NIWRG’s argument fails. While water rights under state law are based upon
and measured by past appropriation and use, federal reserved rights include water needed to meet
future as well as present tribal needs and are not limited by past irrigation practices. E.g.,
Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600 (awarding tribes water under the practically irrigable acreage
standard, not simply existing uses, because “the water was intended to satisfy the future as well
as the present needs of the Indian Reservations”); R. at 2232 (Special Master Report, Arizona I)

20

NIWRG similarly characterizes all three Agreements with the Tribe—1873, 1887 and 1889—
President Grant’s 1873 Executive Order, and relevant Congressional actions between 1886 and
1891 as recognizing agriculture as a primary purpose of the reservation. NIWRG Br. at 7-10. As
explained in Section II supra, limiting the Tribe’s Reservation to an agricultural purpose is
contrary to the historical record and Idaho II.
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(tribes are entitled to reserved water rights for use in the “indefinite future to satisfy the needs of
Indian tribes . . . as those needs might develop”); id at 2228 (“the United States may, when it
creates an Indian reservation, reserve water for the future needs of that Reservation . . . .”). It
would be an extraordinary denial of due process to the United States and the Tribe to foreclose
them from introducing evidence of the extent of the Tribe’s future needs for water to fulfill what
NIWRG concedes is a “primary purpose” of the Reservation.
This Court should accordingly affirm the district court determination that agriculture is a
purpose of the Reservation and that the quantity of reserved water necessary to fulfill this
purpose is to be decided by the district court in the quantification stage of this case.
C.

Reserved Water to Fulfill the Domestic Purposes of the Reservation Cannot
be Defeated by the Source of the Water or by State Law.

The Tribe claims consumptive water rights for domestic uses, which includes water for
drinking, bathing, cleaning and general household uses. R. at 9-10 (Tribal Claims Cover Letter
from Vanessa Boyd Willard, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Gary Spackman, Dir., Idaho Dep’t of
Water Resources (Jan. 30, 2014) (“Tribal Claims Letter”)). The Tribe relies on groundwater as
the source of water to meet the present and future domestic needs of homes within the
Reservation. Although the district court found that “the parties do not dispute the reservation
carries federal reserved water rights for domestic use,” R. at 4323 (Order on Mots. S.J.), NIWRG
advances two arguments on appeal to counter the common-sense proposition that the Reservation
has a basic need for reserved water for domestic purposes to make it livable. NIWRG first
claims that reserved water rights may not extend to groundwater. NIWRG Br. at 23. NIWRG
asks this Court to rule that as a legal matter there cannot be a claim for groundwater “due to a
lack of binding authority.” NIWRG Br. at 25. But that is no rationale at all—there is no binding
authority either way.

But, there is a compelling argument supporting the inclusion of
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groundwater, as the Winters doctrine turns on the purposes of the Reservation, not on the source
from which the water is produced, and the clear weight of authority supports the extension of
reserved water rights to groundwater.
NIWRG then claims that the Tribe’s reserved water rights for domestic uses are
unnecessary because state law provides a permitting exemption for domestic uses. NIWRG Br.
at 24. This same assertion was recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d
at 1272, and it should be rejected here as well. NIWRG’s argument also fails because a
permitting exemption under state law is in no way equivalent to a federal reserved water right.
1.

Reserved water rights include groundwater.

NIWRG does not offer any persuasive rationale for why reserved water rights should not
extend to groundwater, asserting that this Court cannot find a federal reserved water right
extends to groundwater until the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly says so. NIWRG asserts that the
Supreme Court “declined to apply the federal reserved water rights doctrine to groundwater” in
U.S. v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). NIWRG Br. at 23. The Supreme Court, however, did
not need to decide that question in Cappaert because it concluded that “the water in the pool is
surface water.” 426 U.S. at 142; see also Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270 n.8 (explaining
same). 21 Nevertheless, Cappaert found that “the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is
based on the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation,” and held that “the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface
or groundwater.” 426 U.S. at 143 (emphasis added). There is no practical difference between
the injunction against groundwater pumping in Cappaert and a reserved right to groundwater

21

In Cappaert, the Ninth Circuit held that “the United States may reserve not only surface water,
but also underground water.” U.S. v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974), aff’d on other
grounds 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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because both ensure that water is available to fulfill a senior right and can limit the use of water
by a junior user.
NIWRG recognizes that “[m]ore recently the Ninth Circuit found that a federal reserved
water right may be sourced to groundwater,” NIWRG Br. at 24 (citing Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d
1262). Despite this, NIWRG points to the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in In re the
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 99100 (Wyo. 1988) (“Big Horn I”), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Wyoming v. U.S.,
492 U.S. 406 (1989), which is the sole exception to the preponderance of case law supporting the
extension of reserved water rights to groundwater. Although the Big Horn I Court held “that the
reserved water doctrine does not extend to groundwater,” because “not a single case applying the
reserved water doctrine to groundwater is cited to us,” 753 P.2d at 99, it nonetheless recognized
that “[t]he logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of the
reservation also supports reservation of groundwater,” id.
Much has happened since Big Horn I, and today there is strong authority supporting
reserved rights to groundwater. The doctrinal basis for including groundwater as a source for
reserved water rights is set out in the Arizona Supreme Court’s carefully reasoned decision in
Gila III, 989 P.2d 739. The Gila III court held that federal reserved rights may include rights to
groundwater, id. at 746-48, and reserved right holders enjoy greater protection from groundwater
pumping than do holders of state created rights, id. at 750. After a detailed review of relevant
case law, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that:
if the United States implicitly intended, when it established reservations, to reserve
sufficient unappropriated water to meet the reservations’ needs, it must have intended
that reservation of water to come from whatever particular sources each reservation had
at hand. The significant question for the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not
whether water runs above or below the ground but whether it is necessary to accomplish
the purpose of the reservation.
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Gila III, 989 P.2d at 747 (emphasis added). 22
The Montana Supreme Court has similarly held in Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093, 1098 (Mont. 2002), that “there is no
distinction between surface water and groundwater for purposes of determining what water rights
are reserved” and therefore, “no reason to limit the scope of our prior holdings by excluding
groundwater from the Tribes’ federally reserved water rights in this case.” Id. at 1099. 23
This Court should therefore follow the careful reasoning of Agua Caliente and Gila III,
which represent the strong weight of authority, and affirm the district court’s determination that
the Tribe holds reserved rights to groundwater for domestic purposes.
2.

A permitting exemption for domestic uses under state law does not render the
Tribe’s reserved water rights unnecessary.

NIWRG also argues that a reserved water right under federal law to pump underground
water for domestic purposes is not necessary because state law permits persons to divert up to
13,000 gallons per day for domestic purposes. State law, however, is generally inapplicable to
tribes on Indian reservations unless Congress has provided otherwise. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217. The Tribe’s reserved water rights vested no later than when the Reservation was
established and are not subservient to subsequently enacted state law, which, of course, might
change in the future.

22

In a 2001 decision by the district court in the SRBA regarding reserved water rights for the
Mountain Home Air Force Base, Burdick, J. agreed with the reasoning of Gila III and held that
federal reserved water rights may extend to groundwater. In re SRBA, Case No. 39576, SRBA
12, at 7 (Id. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. 2001) (Order Disallowing Uncontested Federal Reserved Water
Right Claims), available at http://srba.idaho.gov/FORMS/61-11783disallow.PDF (last accessed
Apr. 12, 2018).
23
Accord Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. U.S., 9 Cl. Ct. 660, 699 (1986), aff’d 877
F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968); Park
Ctr. Water Dist. v. U.S., 781 P.2d 90, 91, 95 & n.13, 96 (Colo. 1989) (en banc). See also
Cohen’s Handbook, § 19.03[2][b], at 1213-14 & nn.25-26.
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NIWRG’s argument has been rejected most recently in Agua Caliente, where water
agencies in that case argued that the tribe there “does not need a federal reserved water right” to
groundwater because “the Tribe has correlative right to groundwater under California law.” 849
F.3d at 1272. In rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “state water rights are
preempted by federal reserved rights” and the dispositive issue is not whether “water is currently
needed to sustain the reservation . . . [but] whether water was envisioned as necessary for the
reservation’s purpose at the time the reservation was created.” Id. at 1272. (citations omitted).
NIWRG’s reformulation of this argument under state law fails here too, because the subsequent
availability of water under state law does not eliminate the need for water to fulfill the purposes
of the Reservation. See also Walton I, 647 F.2d at 48 (“[S]ubsequent acts making the historically
intended use of the water unnecessary do not divest the Tribe of the right to the water.”).
NIWRG also incorrectly seeks to substitute a federal reserved water right with a
permitting exemption under state law. NIWRG claims that the Tribe’s reserved water right for
domestic purposes is unnecessary because “Idaho law provides an exemption from the permitting
requirement for such uses,” and “anyone in the State of Idaho—including a tribal member—may
divert and use up to 13,000 gallons per day for domestic purposes.” NIWRG Br. at 24 (citing
I.C. § 42-111) (emphasis added). 24 However, a water permit “merely expresses the consent of
the state that the holder may acquire a water right.” Basinger v. Taylor, 30 Idaho 289, 165 P.
522, 524 (1917). In other words, NIWRG proposes to replace a judicially-decreed federal
reserved water right with a permissive use of water for domestic purposes under state law.
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The statutory provision cited by NIWRG provides the definition of “domestic use” and
“domestic purposes,” which limits the use of such water to up to 13,000 gallons per day. See
I.C. § 42-111. The permitting exemption for drilling domestic wells to which NIWRG refers is
I.C. § 42-227.
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NIWRG’s proposal would subject the Tribe’s domestic uses of water to state law, which
is exactly the opposite of the Supreme Court’s dictate that “[f]ederal water rights are not
dependent upon state law or state procedures.” Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 145; Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Walton III”). Critically, in times of
shortage exempt uses are administered as the most junior rights in the system. I.C. § 42-607.
Further, the permitting exemption would only allow the Tribe to use up to 13,000 gallons per
day, I.C. § 42-111, a quantity that may be significantly different than the amount the Tribe is
entitled to under federal law. 25

The permitting exemption does not exempt a domestic use of

water from the limitations of the prior appropriation doctrine, and it could also be repealed by the
State’s Legislature at any time.
The Tribe’s domestic claims are also not limited to present use but extend to future needs
for water. See, e.g., R. at 5575 (Notice of Claim 95-16672). Under the State’s exemption, the
Tribe would still need to establish a water right under Idaho law to protect its use from prior
appropriators, which would require a showing of actual beneficial use and trace its priority date
to the date of first use. See City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 841, 275 P.3d 845, 856
(2012) (“When one diverts unappropriated water and applies it to a beneficial use, the right dates
from the application of the water to a beneficial use.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The state law water right could also be lost to non-use. I.C. § 42-222(2) (all state
water rights “shall be lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the
25

In ordering the commencement of the CSRBA, the district court noted that the State’s Director
of Water Resources testified that, “although a de minimis domestic . . . right is limited to a
diversion of 13,000 gallons per day, the right is still limited to historical beneficial use.” In re
General Adjudication of Rights to Use of Water from Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Water
Sys., Case No. 49576, at 20 (Id. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Nov. 12, 2008) (Mem. Decision on Petition to
Commence Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin General Adjudication). By contrast, here the
Tribe claims the reserved right to the full 13,000 gallons per day per well to fulfill present and
future needs. R. at 5575-78 (Notice of Claim 95-16672).
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beneficial use for which it was appropriated”). But tribal reserved water rights vest no later than
the date the Indian reservation was established, and are quantified based on the Tribe’s present
and future needs, which secures the Tribe with a right to use water in the future, even though the
water has not been put to beneficial use. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600.
NIWRG fails to acknowledge the fundamental differences between state water rights and
federal reserved rights when it asserts that the availability of water under state law obviates the
need for a reserved water right for domestic purposes. As the district court correctly held, this
Court should find that the Tribe is entitled reserved water rights for domestic uses because they
are necessary “to make the reservation livable.” R. at 4322 (Orders on Mots. S.J.) (quoting
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983)).
IV.

The Tribe’s Lake Claim is Valid.

The Tribe claims reserved rights to Lake Coeur d’Alene (“Lake Claim”) to fulfill the
broad purposes for which the Reservation was established. See supra Section II; R. at 11-12
(Tribal Claims Letter). The Lake’s importance to supporting the Tribe’s traditional activities
within the Reservation was established in Idaho II. See also n.10. Nevertheless, the district
court concluded that lake level maintenance was not a primary purpose of the Reservation, R. at
4328 (Order on Mots. S.J.), and disallowed all the Tribe’s claimed purposes of use in the Lake
except for the “fish and wildlife habitat” purpose of use, which it allowed to go to quantification,
R. at 4302 (Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use). 26
NIWRG argues that the district court erred in allowing any portion of the Tribe’s Lake
Claim to proceed to quantification and asks this Court to dismiss the Tribe’s Lake Claim in its
entirety; or if it is not dismissed, to instruct the district court to determine the ownership of the
26

The Tribe has separately appealed the district court’s dismissal of the Lake Claim for other
purposes. See supra n.4.
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submerged lands under Lake Coeur d’Alene. NIWRG Br. at 20-22. As discussed below,
NIWRG’s arguments that the Lake Claim should be dismissed because it is not quantifiable, and
that adjudication of the Lake Claim requires an adjudication of title to the Lake bed, are without
merit. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court’s ruling on the fish and wildlife
habitat purposes of the Tribe’s Lake Claim.
A.

The Tribe’s Lake Claim is Quantifiable.

The United States provided the method for quantifying the Lake Claim in its Notice of
Claim. R. at 6279 (Notice of Claim Federal Reserved Water Right No. 95-16704) (“Notice of
Claim No. 95-16704”). The Lake Claim is “for in situ maintenance of the Lake’s natural
elevation” according to average monthly elevations that take into account inflows and outflows
for the Lake based on its natural hydrograph. Id. at 6278-79. The Lake Claim ensures that there
is sufficient water in the Lake to maintain lake elevation that “reflect[s] the natural Lake
processes” before the Post Falls Dam was built, to fulfill the purposes of the Reservation. Id. at
6279. The district court properly concluded that one of those purposes of water is to fulfill the
fish and wildlife habitat purpose of the Reservation. R. at 4322 (Order on Mots. S.J.); R. at 4302
(Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use).
Despite this, NIWRG asserts there is no standard for quantifying the claim without
providing any explanation as to why the United States’ and Tribe’s method of quantification
should be rejected. NIWRG Br. at 21. 27 Similar to the Tribe’s quantification method, state law
also recognizes lake levels as means to protect in situ water. See I.C. §§ 42-1502 (using lake
levels to protect “fish and wildlife habitat”); 42-1503(d) (including preservation of “lake level”).

27

The district court did not address issues related to quantification because this phase of the case
only involves issues of entitlement. See R. at 461-62 (Order Consolidating Subcases & Order
Bifurcating Proceedings).
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Indeed, the State claims a water right to maintain a “minimum lake level of 2125.09 feet above
sea level” for Round Lake.

See Water Right No. 96-8503, available at http://www.

idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/RightReportAJ.asp?BasinNumber=96&SequenceNumber=8503
&SplitSuffix=%20%20&TypeWaterRight=True (last accessed Apr. 12, 2018).
NIWRG prematurely attempts to raise a quantification issue here by misusing this
Court’s statement in Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 922, that a “standard of quantification” of water is
necessary to reserve water rights. See NIWRG Br. at 21. In Potlatch, this Court found that the
federal Wilderness Act does not provide a basis for implying water rights for a federal
wilderness area because “the Wilderness Act does not define purposes that necessitate a
reservation of water.” 134 Idaho at 922. The Court’s decision was based on its conclusion that
reserved water was not necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Wilderness Act, not that any
reserved water right was “unquantifiable.”

This Court used the term “standard for

quantification” in Potlatch to contrast the Wilderness Act with other federal reservations by
which a standard for quantification can be determined, such as the establishment of Indian
reservations, which are for “human habitation,” id. at 920, 922, or the creation of Devil’s Hole
national monument discussed in Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, which was for the “preservation of a
rare fish.” 134 Idaho at 921, 922. In fact, this appeal involves an Indian reservation that the
district court properly concluded included fishing and hunting purposes—purposes that are
similar to those that this Court noted were “quantifiable” in Potlatch.
Moreover, Idaho II and the historical record show that the United States established the
Reservation in 1873 as a permanent home for the Tribe and impliedly reserved water to fulfill
broad purposes, including sustaining fish and wildlife habitat. See supra Section II. Reserved
rights to water in the Lake are necessary to fulfill these purposes. Suppose for instance, that the
Lake was fully drained and the lakebed was dry. In such a situation, the Tribe would not only be
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without the ability to use the Lake for traditional and other purposes, but also would have lost a
fundamental aspect of its homeland as defined by Idaho II. While this is not likely under current
circumstances given the operation of Post Falls Dam under a FERC license, see 127 FERC at
¶61,265, ¶62,169, the Tribe’s Lake Claim is important for protecting the Tribe’s reserved rights
from diminution by junior users today and in the future, where circumstances, including the
existence of the Post Falls Dam, may someday be changed in ways that place viability of the
Lake in question. 28 The Lake claim ensures that, through limiting diversions, the Lake and its
waters, which were central features in the creation of the Reservation, are available to the Tribe
consistent with the purposes of the Reservation.
For these reasons, NIWRG has not provided any valid reason to dismiss the Lake Claim
based on an inability to quantify the claim.
B.

The United States’ Ownership of Submerged Lands in Trust for the Benefit
of the Tribe Cannot be Adjudicated Here.

NIWRG requests that if this Court rules in favor of the Tribe’s Lake Claim, it must
instruct the district court to adjudicate the extent of the United States’ trust title to submerged
land on the Reservation. NIWRG Br. at 21-22. This request must be rejected because allowing
the Tribe’s Lake Claim to move forward to quantification does not—and cannot—require an
adjudication of title to submerged lands within the Reservation. 29 Contrary to NIWRG’s
28

For instance, the licensee could surrender its FERC license, see, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §§ 6.2, 6.4,
and the license for Post Fells Dam provides that if it is surrendered, FERC can require the
licensee to remove the dam. 127 FERC at ¶62,207. However, removal is not always required.
See FERC: Hydropower - How to Surrender a License or Exemption, FERC, available at
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/comp-admin/surrender.asp (last accessed
Apr. 11, 2018) (Upon surrender, a decommissioning plan can include leaving project features inplace for other uses, or removal of project features and site restoration.”).
29
Contrary to NIWRG’s assertion, the district court never “recognized” that land ownership is
relevant here. NIWRG Br. at 22. NIWRG made that representation at oral argument, id. (citing
Tr. at p. 140, L. 17-25, p. 142, L. 13-20, p. 143, L. 15-19), but the court never acknowledged
NIWRG’s contention. See, e.g., id. In its summary judgment order the district court noted that
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assertion, the extent of a party’s land ownership is distinct from the scope of its water rights.
NIWRG conflates these issues, by claiming that “[t]he federal government only reserves
‘appurtenant water’” NIWRG Br. at 22 (quoting Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138), and so
“[d]etermining the extent of the submerged lands that were reserved by the United States is a
prerequisite for finding what water is appurtenant to such lands.” Id. Not so. Here, the United
States has explained that the Tribe’s reserved water rights are not based on its ownership of
submerged lands, but rather on the purposes of the Reservation. R. at 4077 n.11 (U.S.’s Mem. in
Reply to State of Idaho & Objectors). 30
In any event, any inquiry in the ownership of submerged lands within the Reservation is
barred by federal sovereign immunity. 31 NIWRG’s proposed adjudication of the scope of the
United States’ ownership of submerged lands, which are held in trust for the benefit of the Tribe,
is really an action to quiet title to land owned by the United States. See Idaho v Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 282 (1997).

The McCarran Amendment does not give state courts

jurisdiction to quiet title to land, see 43 U.S.C. § 666 (waiving United States’ sovereign
immunity only for “adjudication” and “administration” of “rights to the use of water in a river
system or other source”) (incorporated in I.C. § 42-1406B)). Although the United States has

NIWRG “represents that the issue relates to the United States’ lake level maintenance claim,” R.
at 4328 (Order on Mots. S.J.), but declined to take a position on this issue.
30
This Court’s recent decision in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 162 Idaho 754, 405 P.3d 13
(2017), is not to the contrary. In Johnson, the appellants challenged tribal court jurisdiction over
their construction of docks and pilings on submerged land on the Reservation, arguing that the
submerged land was not tribal trust land. 162 Idaho at 760. Land ownership was relevant there
because, unlike the determination of water rights at issue here, tribal jurisdiction is tied directly
to land status, id. at 761-62 (discussing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) and
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)).
31
Sovereign immunity can be raised at any time because it is a jurisdictional issue. See Zylstra
v. State, 157 Idaho 457, 461, 337 P.3d 616, 620 (2014) (“jurisdictional issues” are not waived on
appeal); State. v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673, 676, 315 P.3d 861, 864 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (citing
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004)).
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narrowly waived its immunity for some quiet title actions, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), such actions
may only be brought in federal district court, id. § 1346(f), and this waiver expressly provides
that it does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands, id. § 2409a(a); U.S. v. Mottaz, 476 U.S.
834, 843 (1986). No additional waiver of sovereign immunity has been granted here. R. at 6280
(Notice of Claim No. 95-16704). Federal law thus precludes NIWRG’s request to adjudicate
land title to the submerged lands under the Lake, which the Supreme Court determined in Idaho
II are held in trust for the Tribe. See 533 U.S. at 265, 281.
NIWRG also says it cannot be “presumed” that the United States owns “all of the
currently submerged lands,” NIWRG Br. at 22, apparently referring, as it did below, to “lands,
which became submerged only after the construction of Post Falls Dam in 1907 . . . .” R. at 2436
(Mem. in Supp. of NIWRG’s Mot. S.J.). Even if sovereign immunity were not a bar here,
NIWRG’s claims fail. NIWRG’s supposed distinction between submerged lands has no basis in
fact. The Lake Claim asserts the Tribe’s right to the natural hydrograph of the Lake from before
the dam was constructed. R. at 6279 (Notice of Claim No. 95-16704). The only difference
between lands submerged under the natural hydrograph and the current Lake level, is that the
Lake now retains its natural springtime water level throughout the summer months. See R. at
2583 (U.S.’s S.J. Mem.); see In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 450, 147 P.3d 75, 82 (2006)
(describing that dam holds springtime natural water levels through the summer). Although the
time of year that lands are submerged has changed, the extent of the submerged lands has not.
For these reasons, this Court should reject NIWRG’s request for an inquiry into the title
to submerged lands.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the district court’s determination (1) that the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation was established in 1873 for domestic, agricultural, hunting and fishing purposes; (2)
that water rights were reserved to fulfill those purposes; and (3) that the Lake Claim can proceed
to quantification.
Respectfully submitted, this 13th day or April, 2018.
Counsel for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe
By: ______________________________
Vanessa L. Ray-Hodge
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